**Cooperative Networks: Altruism, Group Solidarity, Reciprocity, and Sanctioning in Ugandan Producer Organizations**

Abstract: Repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems. Although previous scholarship has identified few dispositional mechanisms that may trigger cooperation among interconnected actors, these mechanisms are rarely compared with each other, or tested across diverse settings. This paper identifies and systematically measures four general mechanisms, i.e., generalized altruism, group solidarity, reciprocity, and the threat of sanctioning, and tests which of them brings about cooperation in the
context of Ugandan producer organizations. Using an innovative methodological framework
that combines “lab in the field” experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data, the paper goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks
and collective outcomes to study the dispositional mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior.
The paper first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure
and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization, and then uses farmers’ behavior in
dictator and public goods games to test different dispositional mechanisms that may account
for such relationship. Results show that cooperation is not induced by other-regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity. Rather, repeated interaction favors the development of mechanisms of reciprocity.